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Non-spontaneous and communi ca -
tive emotive interjections 




Abstract: Th e basic feature of emotive interjections is that they are spontaneous. 
Th is feature implies that they are not intentional and, hence, not communicative. 
Nevertheless,  in addition to spontaneous and non-communicative emotive 
interjections one can observe emotive interjections that are non-spontaneous 
and communicative and emotive interjections that are spontaneous and 
communicative. Th is heterogeneity poses a fundamental problem for the 
classifi cation and description of interjections, and it is this problem that is the 
focus of this article. Th e article presents an ecological pragmatic analysis of 
emotive interjections with special regard to the evaluation of four accounts 
of  the heterogeneity. Th e article’s contribution consists of observation-based 
evidence in the form of an analysis of three occurrences of interjections 
that diff er with regard to their spontaneity and communicativity. Th e article 
suggests that the basic sign relation of emotive interjections is indexical, but 
it also shows that an iconic and a symbolic relation can be added to this basic 
relation.
1. Th e interjectional chaos 
It is not unusual for an area of linguistic research to appear incoherent or even 
chaotic. Nevertheless, interjections are a remarkable one of a kind. In some 
descriptions, interjections are not integrated into grammatical structures 
(Jespersen 1968/1922; Sapir 1970; Stange 2016; Trask 1993), in others, they 
constitute units in the grammar of speech (Norrick 2014). In some descriptions, 
they are non-communicative (Fries 1952), in others, they are devices that 
constitute the essence of communication (Ameka 1992). In some descriptions, 
they are purely emotive words having no referential content (Quirk et al. 1972), 
in others, they are semantically rich and have a defi nite conceptual structure 
(Ameka 1992; Evans 1992; Goddard 2014; Wierzbicka 1992; Wilkins 1992). 
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In some descriptions, they are response cries (Goff man 1978), in others, 
they contain a predicative relation (Meinard 2015; Wilkins 1992). In some 
descriptions, they are involuntary reactions (Fries 1952; Nübling 2004; Stange 
2016), in others, they are items that encode communicative intentions (Ameka 
1992; Wilkins 1992). In some descriptions, they are restricted to expressing 
emotions and sensations (Jespersen 1968/1922; Nübling 2004; Stange 2016), 
in others, they “introduce and connect utterances to foregoing talk, they act 
as tags, they fi ll pauses, they signal listener responses and assessments, all in 
addition to expressing emotions” (Norrick 2014:251).
     A contributing factor to the above chaos is undoubtedly a tendency 
in recent research to extend the area covered by interjections. According to 
Norrick (2014), interjections include: directives like sh!, attention getters 
like pst, response markers like yeah, backchannels like mhm, mm, uh-huh 
and hm, fi llers like um and routines like hello, bye-bye and thank you. What 
these utterances have in common is that they can occur in isolation. But 
this poses insoluble problems if we try to identify common functional, i.e. 
semiotic, pragmatic and semantic, features. Th is problem is characteristic of 
the approaches that use structural criteria, for example Evans (1992), Norrick 
(2014) and Wilkins (1992). Th us, when these approaches fi nd that interjections 
are a heterogeneous class, it is a consequence of basing classifi cation on 
structural criteria. 
      To base the classifi cation of interjections on structural criteria is a choice 
of research strategy; it is not in any sense given by nature that expressions 
of emotions and sensations, directives, attention getters, response markers, 
backchannels, fi llers and routines belong to the same class. Another research 
strategy is to combine structural and functional criteria, taking a starting 
point in structural criteria and adding functional criteria (Ameka 1992; 
Meinard 2015; Wierzbicka 1992; Wilkins 1992). Ameka takes a starting 
point in the structural criteria ”little words or non-words which in terms 
of their distribution can constitute an utterance by themselves and do 
not normally enter into construction with other word classes” and “do not 
normally take infl ections or derivations” (Ameka 1992:105).  Th ese criteria 
result in a functionally heterogeneous set of utterances. Th is heterogeneity 
is then handled by distinguishing between types of interjections based on 
their function. Th us, on the basis of Jakobson’s (1960) distinction between 
text functions, Ameka (1992) proposes a distinction between emotive, 
conative and phatic interjections. However, the structural criteria include 
a number of utterances the functions of which seem to diff er signifi cantly 
from typical interjections like åh (oh). For example, routines like undskyld 
(sorry) and tak (thank you) and onomatopoeias like vov (bark) and ding. In 
order to distinguish interjections from such utterances, Ameka identifi es 
specifi c functional features of interjections. Unlike routines, interjections are 
“spontaneous immediate responses to situations” and “not addressed” (Ameka 
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1992:109). Th e problem is that these two features do not seem to apply to 
conative interjections like sh!, and phatic interjections like mm. Similarly, 
unlike onomatopoeias, interjections are “expressive of a mental state” (Ameka 
1992:113). But it is not clear in what sense conative and phatic interjections 
are expressive. In fact, Ameka distinguishes between expressive interjections, 
on the one hand, and conative and phatic interjections, on the other (Ameka 
1992:113-114). Th ese maneuvers reveal that emotive interjections diff er 
fundamentally from the conative and phatic interjections in terms of their 
function. From a functional point of view, it is therefore unclear what can be 
gained by examining and describing these based on the same premises (see 
also Stange 2016).
      An alternative to the above strategies is to combine formal and functional 
criteria and to take a starting point in functional criteria (Goff man 1981; 
Jespersen 1968/1922; Ries 1952; Nübling 2004; Stange 2016). If you do so 
and consider the functional features that Ameka identifi es, i.e. spontaneous, 
not addressed and expressive, to be criteria of interjections, interjections 
are restricted to emotive interjections, i.e. signs of sudden emotions and 
sensations. Th e work presented here adheres to this strategy and is thus 
confi ned to emotive interjections.
      What is interesting, however, is that even if we apply functional criteria 
and limit the research area to emotive interjections, the area still seems to 
be heterogeneous. Th us, one can observe both emotive interjections that are 
spontaneous and non-communicative, and emotive interjections that are 
non-spontaneous and communicative (Goddard 2014; Goff man 1981; Stange 
2016; Wharton 2003; Wilkins 1992). Th is heterogeneity poses a fundamental 
problem for approaches that use functional criteria, and it is this problem 
that is the focus of this article. An ecological pragmatic analysis of emotive 
interjections with special regard to this heterogeneity will be presented here. 
Th e question to be answered is: How do we explain that emotive interjections 
can be spontaneous and non-communicative, and non-spontaneous and 
communicative, based on functional criteria? Th e article’s contribution 
consists of observation-based evidence in the form of an analysis of three 
occurrences of interjections that diff er with regard to their spontaneity and 
communicativity. 
      Th e article is structured as follows: Th e second section outlines a 
functional account of emotive interjections with a starting point in Jespersen’s 
(1968/1922) defi nition and (1965/1924) classifi cation of interjections. 
Th e third section describes the fundamental heterogeneity that has been 
observed within the area of emotive interjections and outlines four proposed 
accounts of this heterogeneity. In the fourth section, three cases are analyzed 
in order to investigate and describe this heterogeneity and evaluate the four 
aforementioned accounts. Th e last section provides a brief summary.
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2. Emotive interjections as a basic function
2.1 Th e functional implication of Jespersen’s defi nition and classifi cation
Jespersen (1968/1922:415) defi nes the “usual” interjections as “abrupt 
expressions for sudden sensations and emotions”, and then he adds “they 
are therefore isolated in relation to the speech material used in the rest of 
the language”. Th is defi nition is a good starting point for a comparison of 
defi nitions of interjections because it includes all the types of criteria used in 
linguistic descriptions of interjections: word-level structure (abrupt), semiotic 
(expressions), semantic (sensations and emotions), pragmatic (sudden) and 
sentence-level structure (isolated). It also identifi es the three features that 
have been associated with interjections across the more or less incompatible 
descriptions (Ameka 1992; Schourup 1982; Stange 2016), namely 1) they are 
spontaneous, 2) they express emotions and 3) they occur in isolation. What is 
special about Jespersen’s defi nition is that it implies a relation between these 
features. When references have been made to Jespersen’s defi nition in linguistic 
descriptions of interjections, the adverb therefore has, quite remarkably, been 
left  out (e.g. Kryk 1992:194; O’Connel & Kowal 2008:136; Schourup 1982:13). 
But this adverb entails a crucial point. Th e understanding of the relation 
indicated by “therefore” requires a selective inference since the assertion that 
explains the grammatical feature “isolated” includes four possible reasons: 
premise 1 ‘abrupt’, premise 2 ‘expressions’, premise 3 ‘sudden’ and premise 4 
‘emotions and sensations’. But it cannot be because expressions are abrupt that 
they are isolated. Nor can it be because they are signs of emotions or sensations; 
because the sentence I have pain is also a sign of emotions. Th e only plausible 
inference is that they are isolated because the emotions and sensations they 
indicate are sudden. Th is inference also suggests a specifi c interpretation of 
the semiotic premise ‘expressions’, namely that they are symptoms (Bühler 
1965/1934) or indexes (Bühler 1965/1934; Peirce 1986:169-177); i.e. there is 
a lawful or factual relation between sign and object. Th e point of Jespersen’s 
defi nition, thus, is that interjections have the grammatical properties they 
have because of these pragmatic and semiotic features.
      When Jespersen, as a grammarian, classifi es the usual interjections 
based on grammatical criteria, they form a subclass of particles because they 
share the grammatical trait with the particles that they do not take infl ections. 
But Jespersen is aware that words from other word classes can be used in the 
same way: 
As a last part of speech, the usual lists give interjections, under which 
name are comprised both words which are never used otherwise (some 
containing sound not found in ordinary words e.g. an inhaled f produced 
by sudden pain, or the suction stop inadequately written tut and others 
formed by means of ordinary sound e.g. hullo, oh), and on the other 
hand words from the ordinary language e.g. Well! Why? Nonsense! 
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Th e only thing that these elements have in common is their ability to 
stand alone as a complete utterance; otherwise they may be assigned 
to various word classes. Th ey should not therefore be isolated from 
their ordinary uses. Th ose interjections which cannot be used except 
as interjection may most conveniently be classed with other particles 
(Jespersen 1965/1924:90).
When Jespersen determines what they have in common, this should be 
understood as syntactically and morphologically in common. Because when 
the list of interjections includes syntactically and morphologically diff erent 
words, this is precisely because at least some of these words have in common 
that they can be used in the same way. Th is functional overlap is decisive for the 
defi nition of interjections. An example may be illustrative. Th e following two 
interjections are performed by two pilots on an airliner when they encounter 
a bird strike on fi nal approach: 
1
(00:00,00) ((a loud thud indicating a bird 
strike))
(00:00,58) Captain(pilot monitoring): oh
(00:01,13) First offi  cer (pilot fl ying): shit
(00:02,42) Captain (pilot monitoring): ዲ஢
hǎole
((Captain lift s his right hand in an 
unfl appable way indicating that 
there is no cause for concern))
(00:02,84)     Captain (pilot monitoring): just fl y it then1
(747-400 fi nal approach 2008)
Th e expression that the captain expresses in immediate continuation of the 
incident is “oh”. According to Jespersen, oh belongs to the class particles 
because it cannot be used in other ways than defi ned by the semiotic, semantic 
and pragmatic criteria for interjections. Th e expression that the fi rst offi  cer 
utters in the same circumstances is “shit”. According to Jespersen, shit does not 
belong to the same word class as oh because it can be used in other ways with 
the structural criteria that the realization of these functions implies, among 
other things infl ection and dependency relations. In this case, both words 
are nevertheless expressions of sudden emotions and sensations. Both words 
must be understood as occasioned by the incident and can be interpreted as 
an index on this basis; “oh” is a sign of surprise, and “shit” is a sign of surprise 
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as well as concern. One can say that there is a diff erence in response time, 
but it is very small (0.55 sec) and can be explained by a diff erence in tasks 
and task load between the pilot monitoring and the pilot fl ying. Th us, both 
“oh” and “shit” fulfi ll Jespersen’s semiotic, pragmatic and semantic criteria of 
interjections. Th ey diff er structurally, but they have the same function. 
      According to Jespersen, a functional overlap is not a reason for classifying 
words in the same way. In other words, there is no one-to-one relation 
between the syntactical and morphological features of interjections and the 
function they serve. Th e crucial thing in Jespersen’s defi nition and handling of 
the grammatical classifi cation problem is that it implies that interjections are 
not a word class but a function. Hence, to exclude “therefore” from Jespersen’s 
defi nition is not trivial. Because this allows the description of interjections to 
take a starting point in the structural criteria with all the problems this implies 
for a coherent description (see section 1). A solution to these problems is, 
therefore, to consider interjections as a function.
2.2 What is a function?
A function is defi ned as the fulfi llment of a task in the human niche by means 
of an utterance. Hence, a function is a relation between an utterance and a 
task. ‘Niche’ is an ecological concept; it covers the environment that human 
beings are adapted to through evolution. Th us, a function is not a language 
internal relation (Hjelmslev 1993/1943), but a language external relation 
(Bühler 1965/1934). In other words, ‘task’ is a pragmatic category. Th e reason 
for the use of the term niche rather than the narrower term communication 
is that language – although communication is undoubtedly the basic and 
overriding purpose of language – apparently fulfi lls tasks for us other than 
communicative tasks, for example thinking and aesthetic tasks. For a number 
of tasks in the human niche it applies that they can be fulfi lled by other 
means than verbal signs, for example gestures, facial expressions, postures, 
laughter, cries, sneezes, pictures and fi gures. Th e tasks we are interested in 
in this context, however, are the tasks that can also be fulfi lled verbally. Th e 
concept of function is thus related to the concept of function we know from 
models of sign and text functions such as Bühler’s (1965/1934) and Jakobson’s 
(1960), i.e. a relation between a sign and a factor in a situation of language use. 
However, the factors suggested in these models, for example sender, receiver, 
context, are complex. Th is means that the function that relates to a factor may 
include tasks that diff er signifi cantly from each other. Th e function that relates 
to the sender can be realized by utterances like HAAH, åh (oh), lort (shit) and 
for satan (fucking hell), attitudinal adverbials like desværre (regrettably) and 
heldigvis (fortunately), expressive speech acts like jeg har det ad helvede til (I 
feel like hell) and det er for galt! (this is terrible!). Th is article uses the term 
function for more specifi c, subordinate functions. Th is makes it possible to 
distinguish between the functions that the aforementioned expressions serve.
Simon Borchmann
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 10(1), 2019 (7-40)
13
      An important entailment of the outlined functional viewpoint is that 
there is no one-to-one relation between linguistic structure and function. 
Signs that diff er grammatically and morphologically can be recruited to 
fulfi ll the same task (Harder 2010:236-268), for example, as in example 1. 
Conversely, the function may be assumed to prefer certain morphological, 
syntactical and semantic characteristics. Th at is, the morphological, syntactical 
and semantic characteristics of the set of utterances we call interjections are 
motivated by the task (Bühler 1965/1934). It is this relation that can lead us 
to believe that interjections are a word class or that there are structural and/
or semantic criteria for defi ning interjections. However, from the functional 
point of view, this would be putting the cart before the horse. At most you can 
say that the function is a constraint on the form of expression and that this 
constraint contributes to a regularity in the formal realization of the function. 
Determining which forms of expression can realize the function is, however, 
an empirical question. 
     
2.3 Th e task of emotive interjections         
Th e task of emotive interjections must be described with a starting point in 
one of the fundamental features of emotive interjections, namely that they 
are spontaneous (Ameka 1992; Goddard 2014; Goff man 1981; Jespersen 
1968/1922; Nübling 2004; Ries 1952; Schourup 1982; Stange 2016; Wharton 
2003; Wilkins 1992). Spontaneous means that something is happening or 
is done in a natural, oft en sudden way, without any planning (Cambridge 
Dictionary). It is this feature that Goff man tries to capture with metaphors 
in the oft en-cited passage: “natural overfl owing, a fl ooding up of previously 
contained feeling, a bursting of normal restraints, a case of being caught off  
guard” (Goff man 1978:800). Th at is, interjections are basically something that 
happens to us rather than something we do; they are not intentional (Caff y & 
Janney 1994:329, Buck 1994:266). 
 Th is understanding of interjections has a biological, evolutionary basis. 
In Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin describes expres-
sions and gestures “involuntarily used by man and the lower animals, under 
the infl uence of various emotions and sensations” (Darwin 2010/1890:28). 
Darwin considers expressions of emotions and sensations to be results of our 
attunement to the niche. Under certain circumstances, it has been useful to act 
in certain ways, for example when we are threatened. Our perceptual system 
is adapted to the pickup of information about such circumstances (Gibson 
1979), and our nervous system is adapted to transform this information into 
actions. Th e pickup of information about the above circumstances induces a 
state of mind, and when such states are induced, we react in certain ways: 
Certain complex actions are of direct or indirect service under certain 
states of the mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, de-
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sires, &c.; and whenever the same state of mind is induced, however 
feebly, there is a tendency through the force of habit and association for 
the same movements to be performed. (Darwin 2010/1890:29).
Examples are elevation of the eyebrows, opening the mouth, protrusion of the 
lips, strong breath, blinking and trembling. Th ese actions are habitual and in-
voluntary. Th is is indicated by the fact that we also perform them where they 
are of no use. Th e function of these actions is therefore not to solve the prob-
lem entailed by the circumstances that induce the emotion, but to relieve and 
gratify the emotions and sensations induced. However, it may be assumed that 
there has been and still is a functional relation so that the action that relieves 
and gratifi es emotions and sensations, in one way or another, has contributed 
to solving the problem, for example coughing when we are choking. Hence 
the evolutionary edge, hence the habit.
      Th e fact that these actions are basically beyond our control is essential 
to their function. According to Damasio, emotions, understood as the pro-
cesses of performed activities and bodily reactions that happen to us when we 
encounter something in the world, are part of our evolutionally inherited au-
topilot (Damasio 1999). Th ey enable us to act appropriately without thinking. 
According to the biological, evolutionary description, these actions function 
as immediate reactions that relieve or gratify emotions or sensations that arise 
in circumstances where it has been benefi cial to act in certain ways. Now, the 
point is that such actions following Darwin include interjections. Th us, in line 
with this description, the task of emotive interjections – in so far as they are 
spontaneous – is to relieve or gratify emotions and sensations. 
      When Darwin describes these actions as expressions of emotions and 
sensations, this should not be understood as a communicative function. 
Th ese actions are not expressives in the sense of speech act theory (Searle 
1996/1979:15), according to which the action is intended, and the expression 
counts as an act with the social obligations it implies. Th ey are exclusively 
expressions in an observer’s perspective; it is the person who observes the per-
former of the action who understands the action as a sign. Th us, interjections 
are not aimed at anyone, but solely at relieving or gratifying emotions and 
sensations. Th at is why Fries consider them to be non-communicative:
All these expressions seem to be spontaneous reactions to a situation 
suddenly confronting the speaker. (…) Th ey may, of course, be 
overheard by a listener and the hearer gains some impression of the kind 
of situation to which the speaker is reacting (…) Th ese forms (…) are 
not used to elicit regular responses from those who hear them. Th eir 
purpose is not communicative (Fries 1952:53). 
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It is clear that this delimitation depends on a specifi c defi nition of com-
munication, namely that communication entails that the speaker not only 
provides information to a listener, but also does it with an informative 
intention (Grice 1957; Sperber & Wilson 1986). It is therefore a narrower 
concept than what we fi nd in some theories of information, for example, 
Bateson’s (2000/1972:283).
        Th at is, interjections – insofar as they are spontaneous – are not 
addressed and not carried by an informative intention, and, therefore, they are 
non-communicative. In semiotic terms, they are neither signals nor symbols, 
but symptoms (Bühler 1965/1934) or indexes (Peirce 1986). Th is is the basic 
implication of the feature spontaneous.
3. Th e heterogeneity of emotive interjections 
Th e problem with the above description of the function of interjections is that 
you can observe emotive interjections that appear to be non-spontaneous and 
emotive interjections that appear to be communicative. Th is heterogeneity has 
been noticed in the research on interjections. For example, Goff man observes 
that people who are being attended to by dentists use ow! or ouch! as a signal 
to the dentist that they are beginning to feel some pain. Furthermore ow! and 
ouch! can be used empathetically to signal the speaker’s understanding of the 
listeners pain (Goff man 1981:105-106). Wilkins refers to English informants 
having observed that “when their children say “Ow!“, it is not usually the 
case that the children are experiencing any real or signifi cant pain. Instead, 
children tend to use this interjection knowing that it will get their parents’ 
attention, and knowing that it can be used to start a chain of events that will 
lead to their sibling getting into trouble” (Wilkins 1992:149-150). And, on the 
basis of a large corpus analysis of English emotive interjections, Stange fi nds 
that “[o]ne and the same interjection can (…) vary in its degree (…) to which 
it is a spontaneous, refl exlike expression” (Stange 2016:199). 
      Th is heterogeneity has been dealt with in various ways in the descriptions 
of interjections. Without claiming an exhaustive meta-analysis, one can 
distinguish four accounts: semantic (Wilkins 1992), pragmatic (Wharton 
2003), contextual, typological (Goddard 2014) and contextual, parametric 
(Stange 2016). In the following these four accounts will be outlined. 
      Semantic: Th e semantic descriptions are based on the assumption that 
interjections are conventionalized and that they encode speaker attitudes and 
communicative intentions (Ameka 1992). In these descriptions the fact that 
interjections can occur in isolation, i.e. as independent, meaningful expressions, 
plays an important role. Th is means that if they are used communicatively, 
the informative intention must be a part of their semantics. In line with 
this, Wilkins (1992) considers interjections to be speech acts. Hence, they 
have an illocutionary purpose, namely “to show how the speaker feels at the 
exact moment of speaking” (Wilkins 1992:152). Th erefore, Wilkins’ Natural 
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Semantic Metalanguage-based explication of the meaning of the expression 
wow comprises an informative intention in the form of the element: “I say 
‘[wow!]’ because I want to show how surprised (and impressed) I am feeling 
right now” (Wilkins 1992:151 (my emphasis)). 
      Pragmatic: Th e starting point for Wharton’s account is that “most 
primary interjections are under our conscious control” and that “we should 
be careful not to overestimate the expressive, instinctive nature of these” 
(Wharton 2003:51). In continuation of this assumption, Wharton concentrates 
on describing interjections as communicative. Th e description is based 
on the Grice-inspired relevance theoretical concept of ostensive-inferential 
communication (Sperber & Wilson 1986). Inferential communication implies 
that only some of the meaning included in the process of understanding is 
explicit. For example, I can say shit and mean ‘I am really surprised by what 
you’re telling me now’. Th e point is that it is possible for the listener to infer the 
meaning. Th e prerequisite for this form of communication is that the utterance 
includes two layers of meaning: “Th e fi rst, basic layer is the information being 
‘pointed out’, the second layer is the information that the fi rst layer has been 
pointed out intentionally” (Wharton 2003:67). In other words, it’s not suffi  cient 
for me to say shit, I have to say it with the intention that you make the inference 
that I am surprised, and you have to recognize my intention. Hence the term 
ostensive. Interjections, then, are described based on Grice’s (1957) distinction 
between natural meaning and non-natural (i.e. coded, conventional, symbolic) 
meaning. Wharton’s point is that we can produce natural meaning with an 
informative intention, and that this is what we do with interjections in so far 
as they are communicative. According to Wharton, interjections are located 
somewhere between natural and non-natural meaning. To illustrate this status 
Wharton uses the distinction between showing and telling:
to show someone you are delighted with a gift  you allow them to see 
your natural reaction, a smile; to tell them you are delighted you utter 
something like ‘it’s wonderful!’; to utter an interjection like wow is to 
communicate that you are delighted by adding a certain element of 
coding which takes it beyond mere display, but falls short of language 
proper (Wharton 2003:51).
Wharton then describes interjections as ostensive-inferential communication 
as follows: Th ey are located on “various points along a continuum of 
communicative behaviours, ranging from those in which relatively direct 
evidence of the basic layer of information is provided — showing, to those 
where all the evidence provided is indirect — saying.” (Wharton 2003:68-69). 
      Contextual, typological: Goddard (2014:54) distinguishes between four 
types of uses based on the relation between the interjections and the context: 
immediate (stimulus-bound) uses, didactic uses, discursive uses and ironic 
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uses. Immediate uses are primary. Th ey approximate what we have described 
in subsection 2.3. Th us, it is characteristic of Goddard’s Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage-based explications of the semantics of interjections that, unlike 
Wilkins’, they do not include an informative intention component. On the 
other hand, they include components like ‘I know’ and ‘I want’, and immediate 
uses also include conative interjections like sh! Th us, immediate uses do seem 
to be characterized by a degree of consciousness and intentionality. Didactic 
uses are to use an interjection “to display or model a (purported) reaction 
for someone else”(Goddard 2014:54). Discursive uses cover “situations where 
the stimulus is not something in the immediate context, either a physical-
sensory stimulus or a human action or behavior, but rather something 
the speaker is thinking about.” (Goddard 2014:54-55). Ironic uses are not 
specifi ed. Most importantly, Goddard notes that “discursive usages depend on 
prior understanding of how the interjection is used in immediate contexts.” 
(Goddard 2014:54-55). 
     Contextual, parametric: Th e starting point of Stange’s description is that 
interjections proper are spontaneous in the sense described in section 2.2. 
Th is status is characterized as ”semi-automatic” (Stange 2016:17-18). Th e term 
covers that they “function as immediate verbal reactions to a certain event 
or stimulus, and their production is supposed to require less planning than 
that of ‘well-formed’ or ‘normal’ utterances” (Stange 2016:20). Th e reason for 
the use of the qualifi er semi, is that interjections may “vary with regard to 
how spontaneous their production actually is, depending on the automatic 
or conscious appraisal processes involved in the emotional experience” 
(Stange 2016:18). To account for interjections that appear to be addressed 
and communicative, Stange distinguishes between degrees of interjectionality 
(Stange 2016:17). Interjections proper constitute one pole on the scale. For 
these, it applies that they are primarily emotive, produced semi-automatically, 
exclamatory, i.e. produced with increased volume, and that they do not require 
an addressee. Interjections in the opposite end of the scale are primarily 
phatic, non-exclamatory, intentional, and an addressee is required (Stange 
2016:17). According to Stange, the degree of interjectionality is contextually 
determined. In line with this, a number of factors determining the degree of 
interjectionality are investigated. However, Stange doubts that it will prove 
benefi cial to provide a grid of all possible combinations of factors. Instead, 
fi ve parameters determining the degree of interjectionality are suggested: 
”the context of use; the variant used (if alternatives are available): simple 
vs. complex; physical absence vs. presence of the stimulus; the nature of the 
stimulus: concrete vs. abstract; focus on self vs. focus on the other.” (Stange 
2016:201). 
      As is evident from the outlines above, these descriptions diff er 
considerably. Perhaps one could question some of these descriptions based 
on a conceptual analysis, but I will refrain from a theoretical discussion 
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here. Instead, I will try to test and compare their ability to describe a small 
set of carefully selected authentic examples of interjections. Th e purpose is to 
determine how informative and accurate the descriptions are.
     
4. An analysis of spontaneous, non-spontaneous and communicative 
emotive interjections 
In this section, three analyses of interjections are presented. Th e methodological 
approach used in these analyses diff ers from those previously used in the 
studies of the semantics and pragmatics of interjections. Before these analyses 
are presented, the method is described briefl y. 
4.1 Method
All methods have their advantages and disadvantages. In previous studies of 
the semantics and pragmatics of interjections, mainly two methods have been 
used: 1) intuition-based approaches based on constructed examples, literary 
examples or examples isolated from their linguistic and extra-linguistic 
context (e.g., Ameka 1992; Kryk 1992; Meinard 2015; Wharton 2003; Wilkins 
1992; Wierzbicka 1992) and 2) corpus-based observations (e.g. Norrick 2014; 
Stange 2016). A well-known weakness of the intuition-based approaches is 
that the assessment of acceptability and the comparison of variants requires a 
construction (or reconstruction) of the context of use, and this context is not 
necessarily generalizable. In other word, arguments like ”[i]t seems a little odd 
to say (or to write)” (Wierzbicka 1992:161) are not very convincing, and you 
can almost always fi nd so called ‘odd’ or ‘less acceptable’ utterances in natural 
contexts without indications of anomalies. 
      In corpus-based methods, the examples are natural language, the analyst 
has access to the co-text that can serve as support in the interpretation, and 
one can defi ne the context of use by selecting types of exchanges, for example 
mother child communication. Th e problem with corpus-based methods is 
that only structural criteria can be applied in searches, and the search results 
are separated from their extra-linguistic context. Th us, it may be diffi  cult to 
determine whether a particular interjection is spontaneous and whether it is 
communicative.
     Th e method used in the three analyses below is based on ecological 
pragmatics (Borchmann 2018; Hodges 2009). Ecological pragmatics implies two 
overall methodological requirements: Th e object must be natural language, and 
it must occur in a well-defi ned, well-established and specifi able non-linguistic 
context. An ecological pragmatic analysis meets these two requirements 
by concentrating on language use embedded in practical activities, such as 
professional road cycling, rifl e hunting, spearfi shing, recreational diving, 
beer brewing, scheduled air traffi  c and soaring. Such activities can serve as 
well-defi ned, well-established and specifi able contextual frames. Th us, they 
are constrained by specifi c values  and goals; they are characterized by typical 
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courses of actions, procedures, strategies, tools and aff ordances; practitioners 
have specifi c needs for information in order to control, select and coordinate 
actions, and there are norms for the information in the environment that 
they should attend to, as well as well-established sources of information and 
standardizations of information; the eff ects on the body and the emotions 
and sensations that the performance of the activity entails are well-known 
and predictable; and communication is conventionalized and oft en includes 
a phraseology. All this provides us with good indications of the intentions 
and of the understanding of intentions of language users and thus makes 
it possible to determine what constitutes deviation and what does not. Th e 
downside is that the rich contextual description limits the number of available 
examples, and this makes it questionable to generalize from the examples. 
Th e ecological pragmatic approach tries to solve this problem by selecting 
and analyzing occurrences of language use that are archetypal with regard to 
particular aspects of language use. In the present case, the three examples are 
archetypal with regard to their spontaneity and communicativity.
      All three examples are embedded in the activity of soaring, more 
specifi cally the launch. As it will become apparent from the analyses, the 
launch has a potential in relation to the description of interjections because 
it involves fi erce eff ects on the body as a perceptual system, circumstances 
that induce emotions and sensations, demands for the suppression of actions 
that relieve and gratify emotions and clear indications of emotions as well as 
the suppression of actions that relieve and gratify emotions and sensations. 
Th e analyses are based on the author’s cognitive ethnographic studies of 
the activity of soaring. Th e current examples are video recordings from the 
speaker’s, i.e. the pilot’s, perspective. Th e fi rst case, example 2, is from a native 
speaker of English, recorded with a cockpit-mounted camera. It originates 
from an English pilot’s website. Th e second and third cases, examples 3 and 4, 
are from native speakers of Danish, recorded with a head-mounted camera. 
Th is material has been collected by the author as a part of studies of the activity 
of soaring in Denmark. Th e recordings are analyzed and transcribed using the 
program VideoPad.
      In the following, analyses of three cases that include one or more 
examples of interjections are presented. Th e cases have been selected so 
that they comprise 1) spontaneous, non-communicative interjections, 
2) non-spontaneous, communicative interjections and 3) spontaneous, 
communicative interjections. Th e three cases are analyzed separately in the 
order given.
4.2 Spontaneous, non-communicative interjections
Th e interjections below are uttered by a glider pilot during an aerotow launch. 
In an aerotow launch the glider is connected to a tow plane with a cable, and 
the tow plane pulls the glider up to a given height2 (e.g. 800 m) where the 
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glider pilot releases the cable. Both the glider pilot and the tug pilot have 
the possibility of releasing the cable if problems arise during the launch. In 
the current launch, the airbrakes of the glider open. Airbrakes are a device 
used to descend, and they are primarily used in landing. It is critical if they 
open during the launch, because they prevent the glider from climbing. Th e 
airbrakes are locked when the pilot isn’t using them, and it is part of the 
cockpit check before the launch to ensure that they are locked. Should they 
accidentally open during the launch they should be closed immediately. In 
this launch, they open without the pilot noticing it. Th ere are, however, clear 
indications that the pilot notices anomalies caused by the open airbrakes. 
When a glider pilot detects such anomalies during a launch, (s)he should 
immediately release the cable and land while still within the runway. But in 
this case the pilot is passive; he lets the situation evolve. At one point, the tow 
plane’s situation becomes dangerous due to the glider’s open airbrakes, and 
as a consequence, the tug pilot releases the cable. Th e glider pilot is left  at a 
low height, outside the runway and with an obstacle 100 m in front of him. 
Th e pilot stalls3 the glider in an attempt to avoid the obstacle, and the glider 
crashes. Th e pilot is not seriously injured. In this course of events, the glider 
pilot utters a sequence of interjections: 
2
 (00:00,00) ((Th e tug pilot gives full throttle. Th e glider   
  accelerates. Th e glider pilot’s left  hand is placed           
                                                 on the cable release handle.))
 (00:17,25) ((Th e glider’s airbrake opens without the pilot   
  noticing it.))
 (00:25,70) ((Airspeed 43 kt. Th e glider lift s off .))
A (00:39,00)  ((Climb rate is too low due to the open airbrake.  
  It is still possible to release the cable and land   
  within the runway.))
1.  (00:39,87) Glider pilot: fucking hell
B (00:51,00) ((End of runway approaches, height is too low.))
2.   (00:52,34)  Glider pilot:  for fuck’s sake
C (01:03,51) ((Height app. 25 m, airspeed 54 kt. Tug pilot   
  releases the cable.))
3.  (01:04,24) Glider pilot: hh .hh
 (01:04,94) ((Airspeed begins to drop.)) 
4. (01:05,25) Glider pilot: SHIT
 (01:05:65) ((20 meter tall trees 100 meters ahead. Th e pilot  
  pulls the  control stick back and to the left .))
D  (01:06,18) ((Airspeed drops rapidly below stall speed.4 Th e  
  glider stalls.))
5. (01:07,81) Glider pilot: phhh
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6.   (01:08,88) Glider pilot: oh my God
 (01:10,09)  ((Th e glider touches the top of the trees. Th e   
   sound is loud))
7.  (01:11,23) Glider pilot: phruuh
8.   (01:12,08) Glider pilot: fucki:ng
E (01:12,71)  ((Th e glider hits the ground, slides sideways and  
   stops.))
9.   (01:14,97) Glider pilot: fuck5
F (01:15,00)  ((Th e glider has crashed.))
10. (01:15,90) Glider pilot: AARHH
(Airfi eld in England, 2017) 
Each of these utterances occurs under specifi c circumstances that require an 
action and have the potential for inducing an emotion or sensation. In line 
with this, the utterances are indicators of certain emotional and sensational 
states. Th us, the lexical expressions used are oft en used to express emotions 
and sensations, namely (2-1), (2-2), (2-4), (2-6), (2-8) and (2-9), and several of 
the utterances refl ect emotional and sensational states: (2-3) and (2-5) are the 
result of a sudden powerful movement of the diaphragm; (2-7), (2-8) and (2-
9) are uttered with excited abdominal muscles; and (2-8) and (2-9) are uttered 
with excited jaw muscles. Th e utterances thus appear to be actions related 
to emotions and sensations. Th e next thing to be noted is that the actions 
are of no use under the present circumstances; they may even be considered 
counterproductive in so far as they replace actions that could have been useful. 
Th e appropriate action under circumstance (A) is that the pilot releases the 
cable and lands on the runway or at least checks the cockpit or the wings 
to see if there are anomalies there. But the pilot does not release the cable 
and does not check the cockpit or the wings. Th e appropriate action under 
circumstance (B) is to locate a landing possibility outside the runway and, 
when a possibility is located, to release the cable and land the airplane there. 
But the pilot does not turn his head to locate such a possibility. What the pilot 
does under these circumstances is to express emotions and sensations. Th us, 
they appear to be actions that relieve and gratify emotions and sensations, and 
while such actions may be appropriate, and (2-1) and (2-2) enable the pilot to 
become aware of the situation and his inappropriate approach, they are not 
used in this way. Th us, the pilot’s utterances appear to be involuntary. Finally, 
one can note that there is nobody else in the cockpit. Hence, there is nobody 
he can address, the utterances are not caused by other utterances nor can they 
generate a response. Admittedly, there is a camera in the cockpit, but since the 
utterances do not give a fl attering impression of the pilot, one can assume that 
they are not directed at those who will watch the movie aft erwards. Th at is, the 
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utterances above are spontaneous in the sense described in section 2.2; they 
are not intentional, not addressed and not communicative. 
     Th e next thing we can observe is that they vary. Th ere are both utterances 
that meet the criteria of so-called primary injections, i.e. words or non-words 
that cannot be used in other ways (Ameka 1992:105), namely hh .hh, phhh, 
phruuh and AARHH. And there are utterances that meet or are composed of 
words that meet the criteria of secondary interjections, i.e. words that can be 
used in other ways than interjections (Ameka 1992:111), namely: (2-1), (2-
2), (2-3), (2-5), (2-7) and (2-8). Apparently, these grammatical and semantic 
diff erences do not aff ect their function as actions that relieve or gratify emotions 
and sensations. Th us, we can observe that words that diff er grammatically and 
can serve diff erent communicative functions can be recruited to serve the 
function as interjections. 
      Now, what it is interesting is that the variations in expression - although 
the utterances are involuntary - also appear to express variation in emotions 
and sensations. Th is relation can be uncovered in the ecological pragmatic 
analysis. Circumstance (A) is an anomaly that must be perceived and 
responded to according to the values, goals and procedures of the activity. In 
line with this, utterance (2-1) indicates that the speaker perceives an anomaly; 
thus, fucking hell can indicate surprise. Circumstance (B) is a development of 
circumstance (A) which has now become critical since the landing possibility 
aff orded by circumstance (A) is no longer available, and the pilot must actively 
seek out alternative possibilities for action. Th e pilot’s actions, and not least 
the absence of actions, are indications of the pilot’s passivity, in the sense that 
he does not proactively take control of the situation and stop the development 
of the circumstances by acting on the perceivable anomalies. Utterance 
(2-2) indicates that he perceives circumstance (B), but that he places the 
responsibility for the situation outside himself. Th us, for fuck’s sake is typically 
used as a regret or reproach of others. Circumstance (C) is a sudden change 
of circumstances implying that the pilot is alone to deal with a situation that 
has become critical. Utterances (2-3) and (2-4) indicate the shock that this 
can induce. Circumstance (D) entails that the pilot has run out of possibilities 
for action and that the situation can no longer be salvaged. Utterances (2-6), 
(2-7) and (2-8) indicate the fear and the muscular tensions induced under 
this circumstance. Circumstance (E) is the outcome of the course of events 
and actions, and (2-10) indicates the emotional state of the pilot under this 
circumstance. Th us, if we compare the utterances with the circumstances, 
there is a very close connection between 1) the circumstances, 2) the semantic 
constraints of the words and the physiological indications and 3) the emotions 
and sensations that the diff erent circumstances can induce. Th ese relations 
between circumstances, signs and objects can be illustrated in this way:
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Circumstance Sign Object
Climb rate is too low fucking hell surprise, wonder
Gloss: ‘this is abnormal’
Height is too low for fuck’s sake frustration, grievance
Gloss:  ‘this could be diff erent’ 
   ‘this ought to be diff erent’ 
   ‘someone other than me is
   respon sible for this’
Tug pilot releases the cable hh .hh shock (strong movement of 
the diaphragm) 
Low height, no runway SHIT disturbed surprise
Gloss: ‘this is real’
            ‘this is dangerous’
Tall trees ahead, low speed phh strain
Th e glider stalls oh my God fear, despair
Th e glider touches trees phruuh fear, strain
Th e glider falls to the ground fucki:ng frustration, strain
Th e glider hits the ground fuck frustration, strain
Th e pilot has crashed AARHH rage
What can be noted here is the variation of signs: some are innate bodily 
reactions, others are learned cultural, conventionally guided actions. Th e latter 
are particularly interesting. Because they show that the spontaneous actions 
of the speaker are not only learned and governed by conventions, but also 
involve some kind of selection of these conventions so that the action can be 
understood as information about specifi c emotions and sensations. From the 
functional point of view, we can say that the niche makes an inventory of forms 
that diff erentiate emotions and sensations available to language users, and that 
our body borrows from the inventory when it carries out the task of relieving 
and gratifying emotions and sensations. Just as the relief or gratifi cation of a 
particular emotion prefers one natural sign over another, it also prefers one 
non-natural sign over another. Apparently, this selection takes place without 
the awareness of the speaker.  
      In summary: 1) Th ere are spontaneous interjections in the original 
sense, i.e. not intended, not addressed and therefore not communicative, 2) 
these appear to serve the function of relieving and gratifying emotions and 
sensations, 3) the performance of this function is independent of whether 
interjections are primary or secondary, and 4) interjections – although 
spontaneous – may be characterized by the selection of conventional 
expressions that are informative with regard to the emotional and sensational 
state of the speaker. Th ese observations can now be compared to the four 
accounts of the heterogeneity of interjections. 
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      Wharton’s pragmatic account can be ignored as it is limited to the 
communicative function of interjections. And it is not meaningful to say 
that the glider pilot in example 2 intends to show something to someone by 
means of his utterances. Th is is not a weakness of Wharton’s account, but a 
consequence of its relative precision as a description of how we communicate 
by means of interjections. 
      Wilkins’ semantic account implies that the utterances – as illocutionary 
acts – count as an expression of the speaker’s emotions with the social 
obligations that this convention implies, and that this informative intention is 
coded. Th is is clearly a misleading description for examples such as the ones in 
example 2. Th e pilot’s utterances do not count as anything, and the pilot does 
not commit himself to anything to anyone. Not even the basic input output 
conditions for a felicitous illocutionary act are satisfi ed (Searle 1996/1969:57). 
As for the semantics, one can ask: What is the basis for claiming that the 
informative intention is coded in expressions such as aarh, oh or shit when they 
are used without informative intention and are interpretable as information 
about the speaker’s emotional and sensational state independently of an 
informative intention. If we were to prove that aarh, oh or shit are uttered 
with an informative intention, we have to refer to something other than the 
expressions. It may be aspects of vocalizations, gaze, gestures, shift s in posture 
(Th ibault 2011:225); it may be the timing relative to the circumstances, the 
co-text or the context. But it cannot be the expressions arrh, oh or shit. Such a 
description is therefore misleading.
      Goddard’s distinction between types of use (see section 3) enables us 
to distinguish the pilot’s use of interjections from the uses that Wharton and 
Wilkins describe (see section 3). Th is is informative. One can say, however, 
that it seems misleading when Goddard identifi es semantic elements like ‘I 
know’ and ‘I want’ in the explication of the semantics of a set of interjections. 
At least, it is not an accurate characteristic of the pilot’s state of consciousness 
when he utters (2-1) and the subsequent utterances. But this might also be due 
to a vagueness in the semantic metalanguage.
      Stange’s contextual parameter account (see section 3), on the other 
hand, appears to be an informative and accurate description of the pilot’s 
language use. Th is is primarily because interjections are basically considered 
to be emotive, exclamatory, semi-automatic utterances that do not require an 
addressee. Th is applies to the pilot’s utterances. Furthermore, it appears that 
all the values  of the fi ve parameters for the degree of interjectionality that 
can be determined by means of the ecological pragmatic analysis predict a 
high degree of interjectionality. Th us, the context of use is characterized by 
the absence of a listener; the variants used are mostly relatively simple; the 
stimulus is present; the stimulus is concrete; and the focus is on self. It can 
be argued that some of these parameters are vague and that Stange’s corpus-
based method does not enable us to determine the values of these parameters 
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accurately. However, if they are used in combination with the ecological 
pragmatic analysis, they prove to be correct. 
      Hence, the analysis of the fi rst case raises doubts about the semantic 
account as an informative and accurate description. It supports Goddard’s 
typological account as an informative description but raises doubts as to 
the semantic analysis associated with it. And it supports Stange’s parameter 
account as an informative and accurate description.
 
4.3 Non-spontaneous emotive interjections
Th e interjection in example 3 below “HAAH for satan” (HAAH fucking hell) 
is uttered by a student glider pilot during a training fl ight with an instructor. 
Th e fl ight includes an aborted winch launch. A winch launch is performed by 
connecting the glider to an engine-driven winch located at the opposite end 
of the runway. At the mediated request of the pilot, the winch driver opens the 
throttle and the glider is pulled up to a given height (typically 300-500 m in 
Denmark). Th e glider automatically disconnects. Th e pilot can also release the 
cable in the case of hazardous situations. A winch launch is the most critical 
phase of a fl ight, partly because there are fi erce forces at stake, partly because 
the glider is close to the ground with the limited maneuvering possibilities 
this entails. As the glider’s construction can be overloaded, there is a weak link 
between the winch and the glider that brakes if the pull force exceeds a given 
value. Weak links brake now and then, the cable can break, and the winch can 
grind to a halt. In these cases, the glider loses speed rapidly and will stall within 
a few seconds if the pilot is passive. In these cases, the pilot must lower the 
nose to regain fl ight speed, pull three times on the cable release knob, ensure 
that fl ight speed is indicated, evaluate the situation, make a decision as to how 
to land and land. Th is procedure is part of the training program. Aborted 
winch launches constitute several educational standards that must be met in 
order to get a certifi cate, and they are trained regularly. Th e training takes 
place in this way: Th e instructor sitting behind the student releases the cable. 
In some standards, the aborted launch is announced in advance, in others it is 
not. In some standards it is at high height, in others at low or medium height. 
Th e student must show that (s)he can handle the situation in order to meet the 
standard and be allowed to continue the training program. 
      Th e training program is organized in two parts so that the student in the 
fi rst part fl ies with an instructor in a two-seat glider where both the student 
and the instructor have controls. Th is means that the instructor can give the 
student oral instructions and can take over the control if necessary. Once the 
student has completed a number of specifi c standards with the instructor, the 
student passes on to the second part in which the student fl ies alone. In the 
current situation, the student is just about to move to the second part of the 
program. One of the last fl ights before a student is allowed to fl y alone typically 
includes an unannounced aborted launch. In this fl ight, the instructor gives 
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the student an unannounced aborted launch. Th e student knows that this can 
happen, but in the current situation the altimeter is covered in conjunction 
with the training of another standard, and therefore the student thinks that 
she will not get an aborted launch. As will be apparent, the student says what 
she perceives, what she intends to do and what she does. Th is is standard in 
training fl ights, so that the instructor has access to the student’s situational 
awareness and intentions.
3 (00:00,00) ((Th e student gives thumbs-up to the airfi eld   




((Th e glider accelerates, lift s off  and begins to climb))
A (00:31,51)             -> ((Height app. 170 meter. Th e instructor releases the 
cable))
Pic. 1: Th e deceleration causes the student’s head to tilt forward so the head mounted 
camera points downwards        
   
B (00:32,23)
(00:35,38)
((Th e student pushes the control stick slightly 
forward, pulls the cable release knob once, pulls the 
control stick a little backwards, pushes the control 
stick forward and then a little backwards. Th e 
negative g-force is negligible))
((Th e glider regains fl ight speed))
2. (00:35,65) Student: og jeg har fl yvefart  
I’ve got fl ight speed
C (00:36,35) ((Th e student pulls the cable release knob once, 
hesitates, and then pulls the knob twice))
3. (00:38,28) Student: og jeg vil dreje rundt på en afk ortet landingsrunde 
and I will turn for a shortened landing pattern
4. (00:48,14) Student: ja 
yes
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((Th e glider enters downwind leg and landing speed 
is indicated))
og jeg har landingsfart      
and I’ve got landing speed
((Student pushes the radio push-to-talk button, 
grabs the microphone with her left  hand and moves 
it closer to her mouth))
7. (00:56,07) Student: 
(02:23,50)
tango roneo-- tango romeo til bane syvogtyve 
tango roneo-- tango romeo for runway two seven       
((Th e student fl ies a standard traffi  c pattern and 
performs a round out. Th e glider touches down, 
rolls out and stops. Th e student and the instructor 
have a short exchange about the landing))
Th e actions and the communication in this part of 
the sequence are left  out for the sake of space 
((Th e student unlocks and raises the cockpit hood))
8. (02:25,28) Student:     -> HAAH for satan
HAAH fucking hell
Pic. 2: Th e student utters (3-8) while opening the cockpit hood.
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22. (02:27,14) Student: den ((den afb rudte start)) kom bag på mig   
that ((the aborted launch)) caught me by surprise
23. (02:28,70) Student: selvom det står der så kom den bare bag på mig   
even if it is stated it did catch me by surprise
24. (02:30,66) Instructor: kom det virkelig bag på dig  
did it really surprise you




så er det rigtig godt reageret [alligevel]     
well it is very well reacted [anyway]
                                                   [ja]    
                   [yes]
27. (02:33,27) Instructor: og det er det jeg vil jeg se 
and that is what I want to see
28. (02:34,43) Student: godt
ok
29. (02:34,75) Instructor: fl ot
fi ne
      (Gesten Airfi eld, 2017)
Th e subject of analysis is (3-8). (3-8) consists of a nonconventional expression 
haah and a conventional expression for satan (fucking hell). Haah is uttered 
with increased volume. It has phonetic similarities with the word ha which 
according to Den Danske Ordbog can be used to express surprise. According to 
Den Danske Ordbog, for satan is used to express anger, contempt, pain or other 
strong emotion. In this case, the subsequent utterance (3-9) indicates what (3-
8) expresses. Here the speaker communicates that (3-8) is to be understood 
as an expression of the surprise the speaker experiences in connection with 
the aborted launch (A). Th us, “den” (that) is a deictic reference to the aborted 
launch (A). Th e aborted launch is the only relevant referent in the common 
ground (Krifk a 2008; Stalnaker 1974; Tomasello 2008) of the participants, 
and as is evident in the subsequent exchange, it is the aborted launch they 
are talking about. Th e contrastive stress indicates a focus alternative set, and 
thus that there are other aborted launches that have not caught the speaker by 
surprise.
      Now, the interesting observation from a functional view point is that the 
utterance indicates a surprise at something that happened almost two minutes 
prior to the utterance. Th e speaker herself communicates the psychological 
distance to the event and the emotion it allegedly induces by using past tense 
of the verb kom (came) in (3-9). And, indeed, the speaker has performed a 
number of cognitive demanding tasks in the intermediate period that can 
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contribute to the experience of psychological distance. As to this emotive 
interjection, it therefore applies that it is not spontaneous.
      Next, we can observe that the interjection is integrated in the sequence. 
Th e subsequent utterance (3-9) is related to (3-8), so that (3-9) is a specifi cation 
of (3-8), while (3-8) serves both as an illustration of what is communicated 
with (3-9), and an argument for what is claimed by (3-9). Th erefore, one can 
also say that it has a communicative function, and the fact that it is uttered 
long aft er the event that induces the emotion it expresses shows that it is under 
the control of the speaker and that it is intentional. Th us, we have encountered 
an emotive interjection that is non-spontaneous in every sense of the word. 
Th e exigent question is: How do we account for this occurrence from a 
functional point of view? What function does it have? And how does it serve 
this function? 
      In the following, I will try to answer these questions by means of the 
four accounts outlined in section 3, while continuing to utilize the potential 
of the ecological pragmatic analytical method. We have found that (3-8) is not 
spontaneous, but intentional and communicative. Th is raises doubts about its 
function as an action that relieves or gratifi es emotions and sensations. Th e 
fi rst question we need to ask is thus: What is the relation between the utterance 
and the emotion it signifi es. As regards the utterance the fi rst part is uttered 
with high volume, and it is relatively simple. According to Stange’s parameter 
account, both these values  indicate a high degree of interjectionality. Hence, 
it supports the assumption that the utterance relieves emotions and that it is a 
window to the speaker’s current emotional state. However, the stimuli are not 
present. Here we have a characteristic problem of a parameter account; we are 
left  with confl icting values. A hypothesis that could explain these seemingly 
incompatible values, however,  is that (3-8) is the result of a suppressed 
reaction that is triggered only aft er the demands for controlled, appropriate 
actions cease. Darwin (2010/1890:28) points out that a large number of 
expressions of emotions and sensations are, in fact, the result of attempts to 
suppress actions that relieve and gratify emotions and sensations. It is also 
consistent with Wharton’s idea that interjections are under our conscious 
control (see section 3). Th e ecological pragmatic method of analysis can help 
clarify whether the speaker is actually emotionally infl uenced, namely by 
involving the extra-linguistic context as well as the co-text. Firstly, an aborted 
launch entails a direct bodily eff ect that can induce emotions: Th e release of 
the cable produces a high sound and a mechanical impact that is felt as a 
blow against the bottom of the glider; the pull force that approximates the 
plane’s weight (550 kg) disappears suddenly; the subsequent deceleration is 
registered by the archways in the inner ear and aff ects the neck muscles (see 
picture 1); the appropriate action to push the elevator control stick forward 
implies that the plane’s pitch changes 40-70 degrees downwards, with the 
negative g-force this movement implies. We can add that these stimuli are 
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very concrete and thus, according to Stange, support the assumption of a high 
degree of interjectionality. Secondly, the circumstances have the potential to 
induce emotions and sensations because of the risks they entail. Statistically, 
winch launch is the most dangerous phase of the fl ight. Th ere are violent 
forces at stake; one is close to the ground; and one passes layers of air where 
wind speed and wind direction change and where there may be turbulence. 
Incorrect actions or a loss of attention can be fatal. Th ese risks generally have 
the potential to induce emotions such as nervousness, fear and tension. Th e 
current event also has the potential to induce surprise. It is the instructor’s task 
to ensure that the aborted launch comes as a surprise to the student, and in the 
current situation, the covered altimeter is a contraindication of a simulation 
of an aborted launch. In summary, all the conditions for the inducement of 
emotions and sensation are fulfi lled. 
      Th e fact that the student is emotionally infl uenced is evident from 
the subsequent course of actions. Here, she deviates from procedures and 
phraseology. Th us, she only pulls once on the cable release knob (3-B) 
under circumstance (3-A). And as she pulls the cable release she also pulls 
the elevator control stick slightly backwards (3-B) instead of keeping it in a 
forward position until fl ight speed is regained. Only aft er she has ensured 
indicated fl ight speed does she pull three times on the release knob (3-C), and 
here she pulls once, hesitates and pulls twice. With (3-5) the student begins an 
utterance without fi nishing it. (3-6) expresses hesitation and doubt. Utterance 
(3-7) diff ers from radio phraseology. Although the student does not yet have 
a radio certifi cate, she knows and has previously used the local phraseology. It 
implies that the recipient, the sender, the position and the intention must be 
stated. Likewise, roneo is not a part of the radiotelephonic alphabet. All these 
deviations indicate that the student was surprised and that she is tense. And 
in so far as the student nevertheless refrains from uttering the interjection 
immediately when the stimuli occur, it seems that interjections may be under 
our conscious control.
      Th ese facts support the hypothesis that the interjection is the result of 
a suppressed action that is only performed when the demands for controlled, 
appropriate actions cease. An interesting comparison can be made with example 
2: In this case the speaker relieves and gratifi es emotions spontaneously and 
uninhibited. But he also crashes. 
      Th e problem with this hypothesis, however, is that it cannot explain the 
fact that the expression – as the co-text indicates – is intentional and has a 
communicative function. Here, Stange’s parameter account is of no help. And, 
surely, it would be misleading to say that the utterance is phatic. Wharton’s 
account, on the other hand, seems to have an explanatory value. According 
to Wharton, the speaker must produce (3-8) with the intention of showing 
her emotional state. Th e expression is direct evidence of the basic layer of 
information, namely that she was surprised. Most importantly, the function of 
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showing is not restricted to the current emotional state; emotional states with a 
temporal displacement can also be shown. Note also that this account does not 
rule out that she is still aff ected by the inhibited action. Th is would only make 
the basic layer of information all the more convincing. Th is account seems to 
be both informative and accurate in relation to the current use. Here the co-
text indicates that (3-8) can be assigned a rhetorical function as an illustration 
of and as an argument for what is claimed with the subsequent utterance (3-
9). Indeed, the speaker has a motivation to convince the listener that she was 
surprised. Because – as it appears in the subsequent exchange – this contributes 
to the positive evaluation of her performance. Th is interpretation seems to 
explain all the values  of Stange’s parameters. Th erefore, Wharton’s account is 
supported, and consequently, we can say that the function of utterances like 
(3-8) is to show an emotional or sensational state. 
      Th e fact that (3-8) is uttered with an informative intention also makes 
it possible to analyze it as a speech act. But here it becomes clear that it does 
not fulfi l the sincerity condition as an expressive speech act: Th e speaker is not 
in the emotional state that she shows she is in. Rather, we must regard (3-8) 
as an imitation of a speech act, and as such, it is not an independent act, but 
assigned to a subordinate rhetorical function as an illustration and argument 
for the assertive speech act (3-9). Note, thus, that (3-8) cannot be understood 
isolated from (3-9).
      According to Goddard (3-8) must be an example of discursive use, 
i.e. “situations in which the stimulus is not something in the immediate 
context, either a physical-sensory stimulus or a human action or behavior, 
but rather something the speaker is thinking about” (Goddard 2014:55). One 
can discuss whether the speaker is ‘thinking’ about stimuli, or whether it is 
rather the tension that remains and contributes to the persuasiveness of the 
basic layer information. Goddard does not specify the use further. On the 
other hand, his claim that discursive uses depend on prior understanding of 
how the interjection is used in immediate contexts is vital. If the utterance 
is to serve the function as ostensive-inferential communication, the listener 
must understand how the interjection is used in immediate contexts. Th is is 
what makes the utterance persuasive: She was as surprised as the imitated 
interjection would have indicated in an immediate context. Th at is what she 
wants to show. It also points to a decisive fl aw in the semantic account: If the 
informative intention is part of the semantics of the interjection, it blocks this 
use. In other words, the semantic account is functionally inconsistent.
         Finally, we can – by virtue of the ethnographic aspect of the ecological 
pragmatic method – ask the informant why she said what she said. She 
answered: 
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Jeg ville sige til ham at den kom som en overraskelse. Jeg ved godt at den 
står i mine normer, men ikke med afdækket højdemåler. Han klarede 
det meget godt at give mig den.
I wanted to say to him that it came as a surprise. I know it is stated in the 
educational standards, but not with a covered altimeter. He did a god job 
giving it to me. (Interview with informant)
Th is supports the interpretation of the utterance’s function as showing an 
emotion or sensation.
      Th e above thus supports Wharton’s description as the most informative 
and accurate as regards utterances like (3-8), i.e. utterances where the context 
is characterized by the speaker having to suppress his/her reactions to stimuli 
at the time they occur, where the expressions are simple, where stimuli are 
concrete, where stimuli are absent and where the focus is not only on self. 
One can also say that Goddard’s description is informative insofar as it 
distinguishes this use from immediate uses. But more importantly, it supports 
Goddard’s claim that all other types of use are based on the primary, immediate 
use. Goddard’s description therefore simultaneously points to a functional 
inconsistency in the semantic descriptions: Th e informative intention cannot 
be part of the semantics of interjections if they are to be used to show emotions 
and sensations; it must be a part of their pragmatics.
      In section 2.1, we have described the sign relation of the basic interjection 
as a symptom/index, i.e. a lawful or factual relation between sign and object. 
Should we characterize the sign relation that characterizes the use of (3-8), 
we can say that an iconic relation is added to the indexical relation: Th ere is 
a similarity relation between (3-8) and the index that the speaker imitates by 
means of (3-8). 
4.4. Spontaneous, communicative emotive interjections
Th e last example is a spontaneous, communicative interjection. Th is type is 
probably the most frequent in the linguistic corpora and also the one that 
most linguistic descriptions have concentrated on. According to the functional 
implications of the spontaneity described in subsection 2.2, it is actually the 
most complicated and problematic one: How can an interjection be both 
spontaneous and communicative? Th is is basically a contradiction.
      Like (3-8) the example occurs in a winch launch in a training fl ight. Th e 
student sits in the front seat, and the instructor sits behind the student. Th is 
student is not as far along in the training program as the student in example 
3. A special contextual circumstance is that the student has had a series of bad 
experiences in which the instructor has intervened in the fl ight. Because of 
this, the student has lost confi dence and motivation. Th e instructor has been 
made aware of this by another student, and the goal of this fl ight is to give the 
student a good experience that can help her regain confi dence and motivation. 
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4
(00:00,00) ((Th e cable tightens, and the glider accelerates))
(00:07,45) ((Th e glider lift s off . Airspeed is 70 km/h and rapidly 
increasing))
(00:08,46) ((Airspeed is 90 km/h, the student keeps the control 
stick in a forward position))
1. (00:08,68) Instructor: og opad opad       
and upwards upwards
2. (00:09,75) Instructor: der er fl yvefart  
there is fl ight speed
’we’ve got fl ight speed’













pull a little more
((Th e student levels off  nicely))
((Th e cable releases automatically))
((Th e student pulls the cable release knob three times))
6.  (00:39,44) Instructor: super  
super
7. (00:41,32) Student:  ->  [åhh]  
[ohh]
 Pic. 3: Airspeed is ok, the glider is stable, task load is low.
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8. (00:41,41) Instructor: [og så] ind over betonpladsen






10. (00:44,06) Student: ja
yes
11. (00:45,17) Instructor: ligesom de andre
like the others
12. (00:45,23) Student: ja jeg skal lige ha (0.8) ro på
yes I just need to (0.8) calm down
13. (00:47,81) Instructor: 400 meter
400 meters
(True Airfi eld, 2017)
In a winch launch, the pilot must pull the elevator control stick slowly 
backwards when the glider has gained fl ight speed. If the pilot pulls too much 
too quickly, there is a risk that the weak link brakes, and this will leave the 
pilot in a situation that is virtually impossible to salvage. Th e pull must be 
slight in the beginning, and then, when the glider gains height and the angle 
to the winch changes, the pilot can pull more and more. In the fi nal phase 
immediately before the cable releases, the pilot must push the stick slightly 
forward and level off . 
      In this launch, the student is too passive in the fi rst phases. Each of the 
instructor’s utterances (4-1), (4-2), (4-3), (4-4) and (4-5) are uttered because 
the student does not pull suffi  ciently on the elevator control stick. As height is 
gained, however, the student acts appropriately; she checks her course, pulls 
suffi  ciently on the elevator control stick, levels off  nicely, pulls three times on the 
cable release knob, and they also achieve a good height (4-13). For this reason, 
and perhaps also considering the student’s general psychological condition, 
the instructor praises the student with the utterance (4-6). Immediately aft er 
this, the interjection that we are going to analyze occurs. 
      Utterance (4-7) is a so-called primary interjection. According to Den 
Danske Ordbog, åh is used to express many diff erent emotions, for example 
enthusiasm, pleasure, surprise and disappointment. In this context it can be 
understood as a sign of relief and joy because the start went relatively well 
and because the speaker was praised by the instructor. Th is interpretation is 
supported by an interview with the informant. Th e answer to the question 
“why did you say åh?“ she answered: “det var rart at det lykkedes, og det var 
rart med anerkendelsen” (It was nice that I succeeded, and it was nice to get 
recognition).
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      Th e utterance must be considered spontaneous as it is uttered 
in immediate continuation of the instructor’s super (4-7) signaling the 
acknowledgment that induces the emotion that the speaker’s åhh is a sign of. On 
the other hand, it can be considered communicative because it 1) is integrated 
into an exchange as a response to another utterance, 2) can be understood as 
an appropriate response to this utterance; 3) can be considered intentional 
as it is not inappropriate in the situation and does not replace an appropriate 
action and 4) is relevant in the current context where the student’s general 
psychological state has been thematized and forms the basis for the purpose of 
the fl ight. Th us, the utterance appears both spontaneous and communicative. 
Th is means that accounts that assume the original and basic function of 
interjections such as Darwin’s (2010/1890) and Ries’ (1952) are insuffi  cient. 
Again, we have to turn to accounts of interjections as communicative.
      In this case, Wilkins’ proposal that interjections are speech acts with 
an illocutionary purpose seems to have explanatory value. Th us, for (4-7) 
the following applies: Normal input and output conditions (Searle 1996/1969) 
obtain; the propositional content rule (ibid.) is satisfi ed (an expressive speech 
act does not need to have a propositional content); the preparatory rules (ibid.) 
are satisfi ed since there are stimuli in the situation that can induce an emotion 
and since the listener is not aware of the speaker’s emotions; the sincerity rule 
(ibid.) of an expression of relief and joy appears to be fulfi lled based on what 
the analysis has revealed about the context. It is also supported by utterance (4-
12) indicating that the speaker has been tense. As to the essential rule (ibid.), 
the question arises: In what sense can we say that (4-7) counts as an expression 
of the emotional state of the speaker?
      Th e count-as-relation is Searle’s account of the informative intention. 
It is a conventional relation and, thus, an example of non-natural meaning. 
Now, the problem is this: How is the informative intention (ostensively) 
expressed, and in what sense does it commit the speaker. Again, we can reject 
the semantic account implying that the informative intention is coded in the 
expression. Th is is also clear in the speech act analytical perspective: Th e fact 
that the sign is a spontaneous expression of emotions and sensations and thus 
does not in itself carry an informative intention is the prerequisite for the 
sincerity condition to be satisfi ed. 
      According to Wharton (see section 3), the communicative function 
of interjections is that the speaker produces a more or less natural sign of 
emotional or sensational states with the informative intention that the listener 
infers the emotional state of the speaker based on the utterance as a natural 
sign of an emotional state. Th is is an informative and accurate description of 
(3-8). But there seems to be a diff erence between (3-8) and (4-7). Th e speaker 
does not show her emotional state. Rather the speaker lets her body show 
her emotional state. Th at is, it is an absence of suppression or inhibition. 
And this absence can be considered intentional insofar as it is possible to 
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suppress or inhibit such actions. Based on Wilkins’ idea of interjections as 
speech acts and Wharton’s description of interjections as ostensive-inferential 
communication, we can say that the illocutionary purpose is that the speaker 
lets her emotional state manifest itself and that the manifestation counts as 
a sincere expression of the emotion in that the speaker commits herself to 
the absence of suppression or inhibition. It is vital that the expression has 
a dual function: it functions non-communicatively as an action that relieves 
or gratifi es emotions, and it functions communicatively by refraining from 
suppressing or inhibiting the action. Th ere is, thus, a special focus on the 
sincerity condition; the expression counts as an expression of the emotional 
state of the speaker because the sincerity condition is satisfi ed. Th e sincerity 
condition and the essential condition “overlap” (Searle 1996/1969:66-67). Th e 
convention is, therefore, that the speaker lets the body show. Th at is what the 
speaker commits herself to, and not the emotional state.
      Th e problem with Goddard’s typology is that we cannot distinguish the 
utterances in example 2 from the utterance (4-7). And there is an important 
diff erence. In the fi rst case, there is no informative intention; in the second, 
there is an informative intention. Stange’s characterization of interjections 
proper as semi-automatic, on the other hand, points to this possible diff erence 
as it indicates that interjections may vary with regard to how spontaneous 
their production actually is. According to Stange, it depends on the automatic 
or conscious appraisal processes involved in the emotional experience. As far 
as the parameters are concerned, they require a method to determine their 
values,  and once again they leave us with apparently incompatible values. On 
the other hand, by determining the values of the proposed parameters, we can 
actually distinguish between degrees of interjectionality. Th us, the values that 
apply to (4-7) diff er from the values that apply to the utterances in example 2 
and from the values that apply to (3-8). Th erefore, Stange’s parameter account 
is informative.
       Finally, we can determine the sign relation that characterizes (4-7). It 
diff ers both from the lawful relation of the index we saw in example 2, and 
from the similarity relation of the icon we saw in example 3. As Wilkins’ and 
Wharton’s accounts (see section 3) indicate, the sign relation that characterizes 
(4-7) is a conventional relation. Above, this convention has been described as 
follows: the speaker commits herself to letting her body show the emotional 
state she is in. By virtue of this convention we can characterize the relation as a 
symbolic relation. A symbolic relation is added to the basic indexical relation. 
Th us, there is a conventional relation between (4-7) and the index the speaker 
lets her body show with (4-7). 
5. Conclusion
Th e starting point for these analyses was that emotive interjections are a 
function and that the function is a spontaneous and non-communicative 
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relief and gratifi cation of emotions and sensations. Th is raised the question: 
How can we explain the fact that some interjections are non-spontaneous 
and/or communicative? Based on an ecological pragmatic analysis of three 
carefully selected examples, the article has answered this question by applying 
and evaluating four accounts of this heterogeneity.
      Th e result is clear in several respects. Th e semantic account, which 
implies that the informative intention is part of the semantics of interjections, 
can be rejected. Th e analyses here show that this account is misleading as 
regards spontaneous, non-communicative interjections and that it blocks 
the description of the rhetorical function of interjections as illustrations and 
arguments and the description of interjections as felicitous speech acts. 
      As for the assumption that interjections are speech acts, it appears 
that only some emotive interjections are speech acts. For these acts it applies 
that the essential condition and the sincerity condition coincide. In order 
to satisfy the sincerity condition, the act that indicates the emotional state 
must be spontaneous. Th is description is informative as regards some emotive 
interjections.
     Th e pragmatic account is limited to interjections with a communicative 
function. However, it provides an accurate description of such interjections: 
Speakers can produce an index that shows an emotional state, with an 
informative intention. However, as regards spontaneous, communicative 
interjections, the term appears to be inadequately specifi ed. Rather, the 
speaker lets her body show her emotional state. 
      Goddard’s contextual typology appeared to be informative insofar 
as it could distinguish between immediate and discursive uses. But it is not 
suffi  ciently informative to distinguish immediate uses without an informative 
intention from immediate uses with an informative intention. On the other 
hand, Goddard’s claim that the immediate use is the basis for discursive uses 
and other types of use proved informative and accurate. 
      Stange’s contextual parameter account proved to be the only one capable 
of both embracing and distinguishing between all the presented examples 
of interjections: 1) spontaneous, non-communicative, 2) non-spontaneous, 
communicative and 3) spontaneous, communicative. Th e identifi ed para-
meters appeared to be too general, and a corpus analysis is insuffi  cient as a 
method to precisely determine the values  of the parameters. However, the 
proposed ecological pragmatic method of analysis enabled the parameters to 
be assigned a value, and the parameters showed that they are informative with 
regard to diff erences in the spontaneity and communicativity of interjections.
      Th e ecological pragmatic method of analysis and the associated 
selection of paradigmatic examples made it possible to distinguish between 
three possible interjectional sign functions: 
Simon Borchmann















and sensations by 
imitating the relief 
and gratifi cation 
of emotions and 
sensations
Show emotions and sensations 
by conventionally letting 
the body relieve and gratify 
emotions and sensations  
Sign relation Indexical Iconic Symbolic
Th ese three Peircean sign functions are basic. Whether they are exhaustive 
with regard to the sign functions of interjections in general, and whether the 
descriptions of the three functions are generally informative and accurate, is 
an empirical question.
Notes
1 Notice that the pilots alternate between English and Chinese. A large fraction of 
fl ight operations in the global commercial aviation system are conducted using a 
mixture of English and some other language(s) (Hutchins et al 2006). Contributing 
factors are that the ICAO standard radiotelephony phraseology is in English and 
that indexes, checklists, procedures and concepts in a very large part of the aircraft  
fl eet are in English.
2 Height is above fi eld elevation; altitude is above mean sea level. 
3 A stall occurs when the pilot pulls so much on the elevator control stick that the 
angle between the aerofoil and the airfl ow becomes so large that the airfl ow no 
longer creates lift  and therefore cannot carry the plane. Th e plane is helplessly left  
to gravity and falls to the ground.
4 As specifi ed in PZL-Bielsko’s fl ight manual for SZD-50-3 “Pucazc”.
5 Th e emphasis by the letter k signals a particularly distinct pronunciation of the 
k-sound.
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